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I. INTRODUCTION
The Nebraska Supreme Court's decision in Metro Renovation, Inc.
v. Department of Labor drew immediate public response because of the
court placed limitations on the precedential value of Nebraska Court
of Appeals' decisions.1 This Note deals with the less controversial first
section of the opinion. The first issue discussed in Metro concerned
whether or not the district court where the case was filed had jurisdic-
tion over the administrative appeal. 2
In Metro, the plaintiffs claim involved an administrative appeal
brought under section 84-917 of the Nebraska Code, which confers ju-
risdiction in only one district court, that is, the court "where the action
Copyright held by the NEBRASKA LAw REvIEw.
1. Metro Renovation, Inc. v. Department of Labor, 249 Neb. 337, 543 N.W.2d 715
(1996). The second section of the case held that decisions of the Nebraska Court
of Appeals are not binding precedent regarding legal issues to which the Ne-
braska Supreme Court has not yet spoken. Id.
2. Id. at 338-43, 543 N.W.2d at 718-20 (1996).
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was taken."3 Metro sets forth a two-part test to determine exactly
which administrative actions grant a district court jurisdiction over
an administrative appeal.4 While jurisdictional issues may not al-
ways be newsworthy, the practical impact of the Metro jurisdictional
test can be devastating for certain litigants.
For example, imagine a hypothetical case where local parents want
to challenge a school policy at a Scotts Bluff high school. The parents
claim that the policy discriminates against female students. These
parents bring a request to change the school's policy before the local
school board, which denies the request. The parents appeal to the
State Board of Education in Lincoln. The request again is denied.
The parents' lawyer files an appeal under section 84-917 in the Scotts
Bluff County District Court. After reviewing the record, the district
court sustains the State Board's determination. The parents then ap-
peal to the Nebraska Supreme Court.
The Nebraska Supreme Court, in turn, dismisses the case for lack
ofjurisdiction. Why? Because the parents' lawyer incorrectly filed the
initial appeal in Scotts Bluff District Court. According to the supreme
court's interpretation of section 84-917(2)(a), the appeal initially
should have been filed in the Lancaster County District Court, the site
of the State Board decision, because this decision was the "action" con-
ferringjurisdiction. The parties are not allowed to waive jurisdiction.5
The parents cannot refile their appeal because section 84-917(2)(a) al-
lows only 30 days to file an appeal after the State Board's decision.6
Thus, the decision in this hypothetical case is final.
Sadder but wiser, the lawyer accepts another case involving an ad-
ministrative appeal. This time the client is challenging a decision by
the State Board of Mental Health. The Board conducts a fact-finding
hearing in Omaha. The Board's decision is adverse to the client's in-
terests, and the client appeals to the Director of the State Mental
Health Board in Lincoln. The Director then affirms the Board's deci-
sion. The lawyer confidently files the administrative appeal under
section 84-917 in Lancaster County District Court, the location of the
appeal determination by the Health Board Director. Unfortunately,
this time the Nebraska Supreme Court holds that the appeal should
have been filed in the Douglas County District Court in Omaha, where
the fact-finding hearing was held. In this hypothetical, the fact-find-
3. "Proceedings for review shall be instituted by filing a petition in the district court
where the action was taken within thirty days after the service of the final deci-
sion by the agency." NEB. REv. STAT. § 84-917(2)(a) (Reissue 1994).
4. Metro Renovation, Inc. v. Department of Labor, 249 Neb. 337, 340, 543 N.W.2d
715, 719 (1996).
5. Woodsmall v. Marijo, Inc., 206 Neb. 405, 293 N.W.2d 378 (1980).
6. NEB. Rav. STAT. § 84-917(2Xa) (Reissue 1994).
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ing hearing was the "action" conferring jurisdiction. Again the case is
dismissed.
Can the same statute yield such inconsistent results? Unfortu-
nately, the answer is yes. In Metro, the Nebraska Supreme Court re-
affirmed the rule that jurisdiction of an administrative appeal is
proper at "the site of the first adjudicated hearing of a disputed
claim."7 The language of section 84-917(2)(a) itself does not contain
the language used by the Metro court. Instead, the statute states that
the petition to file an administrative appeal shall be filed "in the dis-
trict court of the county where the action is taken."8 The statute, how-
ever, fails to specify what administrative agency "action" is
contemplated.9 Thus, the Nebraska Supreme Court has stepped in
and supplied the definition.
Section 84-917, adopted in 1963, is part of the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act, which sets out the judicial processes that apply to state
administrative agencies.' 0 A common issue when discussing jurisdic-
tion in administrative law is whether an agency is acting within its
"jurisdiction" or scope of authority. This Note does not deal with the
jurisdiction of the administrative agency, but rather jurisdiction for
judicial review of administrative decisions. This Note first will trace
the history of the Metro jurisdictional test and then will compare the
Metro test with the Model Administrative Procedure Act and other
states' approaches to the jurisdiction of administrative appeals. Next,
this Note will explain how the current test is unconstitutional, and
will suggest some alternatives to the Metro test.
II. JURISDICTION CASES PRIOR TO METRO
The Nebraska Supreme Court has been called upon more than
once to decide which district court has jurisdiction over an administra-
tive appeal brought under section 84-917.11 In Metro, the supreme
court ties together all the previous cases with one consistent rule.
Before discussing the facts of Metro, however, a brief synopsis of the
prior cases will help to set the stage.
7. Metro Renovation, Inc. v. Department of Labor, 249 Neb. 337, 341, 543 N.W.2d
715, 719 (1996).
8. NEB. REv. STAT. § 84-917(2Xa) (Reissue 1994).
9. Id. The entire text of § 84-917 goes on for two pages, but the phrase "where the
action was taken7 appears only in subsection (2)(a). The phrase does not appear
elsewhere in the Administrative Procedure Act. Id. §§ 84-901 to 920 (Reissue
1994).
10. Id. §§ 84-901 to -920 (Reissue 1994 & Cum. Supp. 1996).
11. See Board of Educ. of Keya Paha County High Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Educ.,
212 Neb. 448, 323 N.W.2d 89 (1982); Downer v. Ihms, 192 Neb. 594, 223 N.W.2d
148 (1974); Flamingo, Inc. v. Nebraska Liquor Control Comm'n, 185 Neb. 22, 173
N.W.2d 369 (1969).
206 [Vol. 76:204
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The first case to raise the question of district court jurisdiction
over an administrative appeal was Flamingo, Inc. v. Nebraska Liquor
Control Commission.12 After a hearing in Lincoln, the State Liquor
Commission suspended Flamingo's liquor license. The plaintiff ap-
pealed the Commission's decision under section 53-1,116 of the Ne-
braska Code.13 The plaintiff filed his appeal in Dakota County, where
he resided. The Commission made a special appearance to object to
the jurisdiction of the district court, asserting that jurisdiction was
proper only in Lancaster County District Court, where the Commis-
sion's action was taken. The plaintiff, on the other hand, asserted that
jurisdiction was proper in Dakota County under section 53-1,116,
which stated that the Commissioner's decision could be reviewed by
"the district court where.., the licensee resides."' 4 The Commission
pointed out that section 53-1,116 dealt with license revocations, but
not license suspensions. The Commission argued that because section
53-1,116 did not apply, section 84-917(2)(a) governed the jurisdictional
requirements and required an appeal to be filed in the County where
the decision, and therefore the action, took place. The Nebraska
Supreme Court, agreeing with the Commission, noted that both the
hearing and final decision took place in Lincoln. Thus "the action was
taken in Lancaster County."15 The court dismissed the case for lack of
jurisdiction.
The second case to raise the jurisdiction question was Downer v.
Ihms.16 In Downer, the Department of Public Welfare terminated the
plaintiffs disability benefits. The Department concluded, after a hear-
ing in Scotts Bluff, that the plaintiff was no longer disabled. In Lin-
coln, the Director of the Department of Public Welfare affirmed the
decision. The plaintiff then filed a petition in error, rather than an
arministrative appeal, in the District Court of Scotts Bluff, where he
resided. In his motion, the plaintiff stated that judicial review under
section 84-917 was unavailable to him because financial constraints
impeded his ability to file his appeal in Lancaster County, which was a
substantial distance from his home in Scotts Bluff, as required under
section 84-917(2).17 The Commission filed a special appearance, as in
Flamingo.'8 This appearance was sustained by the district court,
12. 185 Neb. 22, 173 N.W.2d 369 (1969).
13. NEB. REV. STAT. § 53-1,116 (Reissue 1943).
14. Id.
15. Flamingo, Inc. v. Nebraska Liquor Control Comm'n, 185 Neb. 22,25, 173 N.W.2d
369, 371 (1969).
16. 192 Neb. 594,223 N.W.2d 148 (1974). The originally named defendant was Law-
rence L. Graham, but Alan H. Ihms was later substituted.
17. Id. at 597, 223 N.W.2d at 150.
18. Flamingo, Inc. v. Nebraska Liquor Control Comm'n, 185 Neb. 22,23, 173 N.W.2d
369, 370 (1969).
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which held that the plaintiff had filed in the wrong district court. The
plaintiff appealed to the Nebraska Supreme Court.
The supreme court held that regardless of whether the claim had
been brought as a petition in error or as an administrative appeal
under section 84-917, jurisdiction was proper in Scotts Bluff. The
court turned to the regulations of the Department of Public Welfare to
define "where the action was taken" according to section 84-917(2).
The court concluded that the Department regulations allowed appeal
forms to be filed in the plaintiffs county of residence. Further, the
court found that the hearings were conducted in the county of resi-
dence and the Director's final order constituted the sole activity con-
ducted outside of Scotts Bluff, the plaintiffs county of residence.
Based on these findings, the supreme court concluded that "action was
taken" in Scotts Bluff.19 The case was still dismissed, however, be-
cause the plaintiff failed to file the required copy of the record from the
Department proceedings with the appeal petition.20
The third case is Keya Paha County High School District v. State
Board of Education.21 In Keya Paha, parents who resided in Ne-
braska requested that the Nebraska school board pay tuition for their
children to attend South Dakota schools. Their request was pursuant
to a statute requiring the Keya Paha School Board to pay out-of-state
tuition for Nebraska school children, depending on the location of the
children's home in relation to the out-of-state school.22 The school
board denied the request and the parents appealed to the State De-
partment of Education in Lincoln. The Department ordered the school
district to pay the tuition. The Keya Paha School Board fied an ap-
peal for judicial review under section 84-917 in Keya Paha District
Court. The Keya Paha District Court affirmed the Department's or-
der, and the school district appealed to the Nebraska Supreme Court.
The State Board of Education, in an attempt to defend its order,
raised the issue of jurisdiction for the first time before the supreme
court, asserting that the Keya Paha School District incorrectly had
filed its appeal in Keya Paha District Court. The supreme court
agreed and dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. Noting that ju-
risdictional issues could be raised at any point in the proceeding by
either party or by the court itself,23 the court held that the "action was
taken" in Lincoln, the location where the State Department of Educa-
tion ordered the Keya Paha School District to pay the tuition. Thus,
19. Downer v. Ihms, 192 Neb. 594, 599-600, 223 N.W.2d 148, 151 (1974).
20. Id. at 602, 223 N.W.2d at 152. The statutory requirement referred to is NEB.
REv. STAT. § 25-1931 (Reissue 1943).
21. 212 Neb. 448, 323 N.W.2d 89 (1982).
22. NEB. REv. STAT. § 79-1103.05 (Reissue 1976).
23. Board of Educ. of Keya Paha County High Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Educ., 212
Neb. 448, 451, 323 N.W.2d 89, 91 (1982).
208 [Vol. 76:204
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the proper place to file was the Lancaster County District Court, not
the Keya Paha District Court. No other statute or Department regu-
lation further specified jurisdictional requirements for appeals from
State Board of Education orders beyond those defined in section 84-
917. The court quoted its opinion in Downer, stating that, as applied
to the Board of Education, the site of "the first adjudicated hearing of
a disputed claim" is the action that confers jurisdiction.24
III. THE JURISDICTIONAL HOLDING IN METRO
Metro is the fourth Nebraska Supreme Court case discussing sec-
tion 84-917(2)(a). The case concerned the employment status of cer-
tain carpenters working for Metro Renovation.25 The company
employed two types of carpenters in its work-employees and in-
dependent contractors. The carpenters who were considered employ-
ees were paid an hourly wage. These carpenters were eligible for
coverage under the company insurance policy, worker's compensation,
and unemployment insurance. The second group of carpenters were
considered independent contractors. The contractors submitted bi-
weekly invoices to the company. Metro Renovation paid these invoices
without deducting taxes or paying unemployment insurance
premiums.
The Commissioner of the Department of Labor appointed a hearing
officer to investigate whether all the carpenters employed by Metro
Renovation were, in fact, employees. The officer held a hearing in
Omaha (Douglas County), conducted an investigation, made findings
of fact, and submitted a three page recommendation to the Commis-
sioner. Based on this report by the hearing officer, the Department of
Labor found Metro Renovation liable for unemployment contributions
based on the wages of the workers who incorrectly had been desig-
nated independent contractors by the company. 26 The company then
filed an appeal for administrative review under section 84-917 in
Douglas County District Court. The district court reversed the De-
partment of Labor's determination and held instead that none of the
carpenters in question were employees of Metro Renovation. The De-
partment appealed to the Nebraska Court of Appeals. The Nebraska
Supreme Court then removed the case from the court of appeals to the
supreme court's docket.27 The Department argued before the supreme
court that the case should be dismissed because the Douglas County
Court lacked jurisdiction over the appeal. The supreme court
disagreed.
24. Id. at 453-54, 323 N.W.2d at 92.
25. Metro Renovation, Inc. v. Department of Labor, 249 Neb. 337, 338-40, 543
N.W.2d 715, 718 (1996).
26. Id.
27. Id. at 340, 543 N.W.2d at 719.
1997]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
The jurisdiction cases prior to Metro arguably indicate that unless
the agency is governed by a statute that specifies where a particular
type of appeal can be brought, as in Downer,28 the supreme court
tends to find jurisdiction where the last step in the administrative
agency's process was fulfilled, as in Flamingo29 and Keya Paha.3O
This interpretation also would fit within the overall language of the
statute. Section 84-917(1) allows a party to appeal only a "final deci-
sion in a contested case."'31 The language in section 84-917(2)(a) sup-
ports this construction, requiring that the claim be filed "where the
action was taken... after... the final decision by the agency."32 This
language at least implies that the "action taken" is the final decision
by the agency, unless a specific appeal scheme in statutes or regula-
tions governs the specific agency.
In Downer and Metro, however, the court pointed out that the Lan-
caster County District Court does not automatically have jurisdiction
over an administrative appeal.s3 Instead, determining where to file
an administrative appeal requires a careful assessment of the entire
administrative process regarding a particular claim. The court under-
took this jurisdictional assessment in Metro and looked for (1) the first
adjudicated hearing of (2) a disputed claim.
Providing examples for guidance, the court applied the Metro two-
part test to the facts of the prior jurisdiction cases. The court de-
scribed the State Board of Education's decision to order the Keya Paha
School District to pay tuition as an adjudicated hearing of a disputed
claim.34 Likewise, the intermediate hearings conducted by the De-
partment of Public Welfare35 and the State Liquor Commission quali-
fied as adjudicated hearings of disputed claims.36
The Nebraska Supreme Court has not yet precisely defined what
constitutes an adjudicated hearing. The Administrative Procedure
Act defines some terms used in section 84-917, such as "contested
case" and "final decision."37 The statute, however, is void of language
defining the phrase "where the action was taken" and therefore leaves
28. Downer v. Ihms, 192 Neb. 594, 223 N.W.2d 148 (1974).
29. Flamingo, Inc. v. Nebraska Liquor Control Conm'n, 185 Neb. 22, 173 N.W.2d 369
(1969).
30. Board of Educ. of Keya Paha County High Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Educ., 212
Neb. 448, 323 N.W.2d 89 (1982).
31. NEB. Rnv. STAT. § 84-917(1) (Reissue 1994)(emphasis added).
32. Id. § 84-917(2)(a)(emphasis added).
33. Metro Renovation, Inc. v. Department of Labor, 249 Neb. 337, 340, 543 N.W.2d
715, 719 (1996); Downer v. Ihms, 192 Neb. 594,599,223 N.W.2d 148, 151 (1974).
34. Board of Educ. of Keya Paha County High Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Educ., 212
Neb. 448, 451, 323 N.W.2d 89, 91 (1982).
35. Downer v. Ihms, 192 Neb. 594, 600, 223 N.W.2d 148, 151 (1974).
36. Flamingo, Inc. v. Nebraska Liquor Control Comm'n, 185 Neb. 22, 24-25, 173
N.W.2d 369, 371 (1969).
37. NEB. REv. STAT. § 84-901 (Reissue 1994).
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it to the courts to adopt a definition.38 Indeed, the statute points to
definitions provided in the various cases. As the cases show, different
proceedings have been accepted as adjudicated hearings. Part of the
difficulty in defining an adjudicated hearing is that administrative
agency actions do not always fall into neat legal categories. When an
administrative agency acts in its quasi-judicial capacity, it may be
conducting hearings, fact-finding operations, board meetings, rule-
making, appeal processes, etc.
Black's Law Dictionary defines administrative actions as adjudica-
tory in character when they culminate in a final determination affect-
ing personal or property rights.3 9 But this definition implies a final
decision by the agency. The jurisdictional test adopted by the Ne-
braska Supreme Court in some cases specifically avoids placing juris-
diction where the final decision is made. The term "hearing" has a
fairly common meaning as a proceeding with a fact finder who evalu-
ates evidence and witnesses from both sides and then issues a deci-
sion. In administrative proceedings, the hearing can be even less
formal, involving only an individual who presents her case to a deci-
sion maker.
The first element of the test, an adjudicated hearing, is trouble-
some to identify in Metro. While the officer in Metro unquestionably
conducted a hearing, was it actually an adjudicated hearing? The de-
cision was not final. In fact, the officer made no decision, only findings
of fact and a recommendation.40 The Commissioner arguably made
the adjudicatory/final decision in Lincoln. In Metro, the court did not
discuss whether the decision by the Commissioner satisfied the juris-
dictional requirements because the test identifies only the first site
that met the jurisdictional requirements; once a site satisfies the juris-
diction requirements, no further finding is required. The Metro court
held that the first adjudicated hearing occurred in Omaha.41 If the
word "adjudicated" was used in its traditional meaning, though, it is
not immediately clear how the hearing officer's work in Omaha was
adjudicatory in nature.
The second part of the jurisdiction test requires the presence of a
disputed claim. Like the phrase "adjudicatory hearing," neither the
cases nor statutes provide a precise definition for the term "disputed
claim." Section 84-917(1) refers to a "contested case." The definition
for a "contested case" is contained elsewhere in the Act.42 While the
term "a disputed claim" arguably could be a synonym for the term "a
38. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
39. BLACIeS LAw DICTIONARY 26 (6th ed. 1991).
40. Metro Renovation, Inc. v. Department of Labor, 249 Neb. 337, 341, 543 N.W.2d
715, 719 (1996).
41. Id. at 341, 543 N.W.2d at 720.
42. NEB. Rav. STAT. § 84-901(3) (Reissue 1992).
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contested case," there is no clear basis for making such an
assumption.
The term "disputed claim" does have commonplace meaning. "Dis-
pute" means a conflict, and a "claim" is a cause of action.43 In Metro,
the supreme court held that an adjudicated hearing of a disputed
claim took place in Omaha. If one considers the situation, however,
what claim was the hearing officer asserting against Metro? Obvi-
ously, the purpose of the hearing and investigation was to decide the
employment status of the carpenters. But the actual claim against
Metro Renovation was made by the Department of Labor in Lincoln
when it found the company liable for unpaid unemployment insurance
premiums. 44 The Omaha hearing could be characterized as follows:
the officer claims the carpenters were employees; the company claims
they were not. There was obviously a dispute between Metro Renova-
tion and the Department of Labor regarding the carpenters. Logi-
cally, though, the Department could make no claim against Metro
Renovation until after the hearing. The hearing, as the court pointed
out, provided the basis for the Department's claim against Metro
Renovation. 45
The court seemed to use this line of reasoning in Keya Paha when
it noted that the initial denial of the tuition payments by the school
board in Keya Paha did not confer jurisdiction-it was merely a re-
quest that the board refused, not a cause of action. No adjudicated
hearing of a disputed claim occurred until the tuition question was
decided by the State Department of Education in Lincoln.46 In Metro,
however, the court held that the action was taken in Omaha at the
fact-finding hearing. Therefore, the Douglas County District Court
had jurisdiction over the matter and the case was properly filed.47
IV. THE MODEL ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT
In 1945, Nebraska adopted the Administrative Procedure Act. Sec-
tion 84-917 was enacted in 1963, two years after the National Confer-
ence of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws issued its first revision
of the Model Administrative Procedure Act.4s Various forms of the
Model Act are used today in 28 states, including Nebraska.49 The lan-
43. BLAcis LAW DICTIoNARY 169, 327 (6th ed. 1991).
44. Metro Renovation, Inc. v. Department of Labor, 249 Neb. 337, 338-39, 543
N.W.2d 715, 718 (1996).
45. Id. at 341, 543 N.W.2d at 719.
46. Board of Educ. of Keya Paha County High Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Educ., 212
Neb. 448, 452-54, 323 N.W.2d 89, 92 (1982).
47. Metro Renovation, Inc. v. Department of Labor, 249 Neb. 337, 341-42, 543
N.W.2d 715, 719-20 (1996).
48. Civmr PNocD=U AND REMED AL LAws, 15 U.L.A. 137 (1990). The original Model
Act was adopted in 1946.
49. Id.
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guage addressing jurisdiction in the 1961 version of the Model Act pro-
vides as follows: "[Plroceedings for review are instituted by filing a
petition in the [District Court of the _ County]."5o The 1961
version provided little direction on how to delimit jurisdiction other
than to imply that the state could choose the district court where ju-
risdiction would lie. While legislators in Nebraska simply could have
designated the Lancaster County District Court as the site for all ad-
ministrative appeals, they chose not to do so. Designating Lincoln as
the central repository for administrative appeals would have imposed
a heavy burden on a plaintiff not located in the southeast portion of
Nebraska. Section 84-917(2)(a) simply left unaddressed the possibil-
ity that agency procedures could provide for tiers of decision-making
that could lead to various "actions" taken by the agency.
In 1981, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws passed another revision of the Model Administrative Pro-
cedure Act. The 1981 version reflects the increasing complexity of
state administrative law. The Conference made two significant
changes regarding jurisdiction over appeals. First, the revised juris-
diction statute designates a particular level of court to have jurisdic-
tion over administrative appeals, usually the district level courts or
the appellate level courts.51 Then, the particular court with authority
to review the case is designated as the court with venue.52 Venue,
according to the Model Act, can be in the district where the state capi-
tal is located, the district where the petitioner resides, or the district
where the petitioner maintains its place of business.53
The differentiation between jurisdiction and venue is key. If the
statute gives all district level courts jurisdiction over administrative
appeals and then limits the proper venue to one particular district
court, all courts have authority to transfer an administrative appeal
brought in the wrong district court to the correct court. In short, all
district courts would have subject matter jurisdiction. As a general
proposition, however, if the statute confers jurisdiction in its entirety
to one particular district court, as does the Nebraska statute, then any
other district court lacks authority to do anything but dismiss the
case. This creates a one-way ticket, no returns, and no transfers pol-
icy for administrative appeals.
As applied in Nebraska, section 84-917(2)(a) confers jurisdiction to
only one district court, the district court where the action was taken.
If the right to bring an administrative appeal rests solely in section
50. MODEL STATE ADmN. PRoCEDURE ACr § 15(b), 15 U.L.A. 301 (1961Xamended
1990).
51. MODEL STATE ADmiN. PRocEDuRE Aar § 5-104(a), 15 U.LA 113 (1981)(amended
1990).
52. Id. § 5-104(b).
53. Id.
1997]
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84-917, then the authority of the court to transfer an administrative
appeal either must exist in that statute or be incorporated in section
84-917 by reference. The legislature has granted no such power to Ne-
braska district courts. As the court noted in Keya Paha, w[tlhe re-
quirements of the statute are mandatory and must be complied with
before the appellate court acquires jurisdiction of the subject matter of
the action.'"54 If a party raises jurisdiction as an issue even before
trial, and the court finds that the case should have been brought in a
different district, the court technically acts outside of its statutory au-
thority by transferring the case.
The Nebraska Supreme Court has not had the opportunity to di-
rectly address the district court's power to transfer an administrative
appeal. The Missouri Court of Appeals, however, dealt with the
court's power to transfer an administrative appeal in Pool v. Director
of Revenue.55 In Pool, the petitioner appealed an administrative deci-
sion to suspend the petitioner's driver's license after he was convicted
of driving while intoxicated. The controlling statute dictated that
"'tihe petition [for trial de novo] shall be filed in the circuit court of
the county where the arrest occurred."56 The petitioner filed his ap-
peal in Jackson County, but the arrest occurred in Clay County. The
Jackson County Court transferred the case to Clay County. The Clay
County Court then reversed the suspension and the state agency ap-
pealed. The court of appeals vacated the trial court's decision, noting
that Jackson County Court had no authority to transfer the case.
5 7
Rather, the Jackson County Court could only dismiss the case, leaving
the plaintiff to file again in the proper court, assuming the time for
appeal had not run.
The court explained that "[vienue is a different thing from jurisdic-
tion. Venue has to do with the place of the proceeding, not with the
power of the court to act."58 The court held that the statute did not
authorize the Jackson County Court to transfer the case to Clay
County because the statute was jurisdictional in nature. Thus, the
transfer was unauthorized and void.
Other state courts have grappled with this issue. The Illinois
Court of Appeals reached the same conclusion as the Missouri court.
In County of Coles v. Property Tax Appeal Board,59 the plaintiff mis-
takenly filed his appeal in the circuit court when the Illinois statute
54. Board of Educ. of Keya Paha County High Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Educ., 212
Neb. 448, 454, 323 N.W.2d 89, 92 (1982)(emphasis added)(quoting Flamingo, Inc.
v. Nebraska Liquor Control Comm'n, 185 Neb. 22, 25, 173 N.W.2d 369, 371-72
(1969)).
55. 824 S.W.2d 515 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992).
56. Id. at 516 (quoting Mo. REV. STAT. § 302.535 (1986)).
57. Id. at 516-17.
58. Id. at 517 (emphasis added).
59. 657 N.E.2d 673 (IM. App. Ct. 1995).
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required that the case be brought in the appellate court. The court
noted that "[u]nfortunately, there is no mechanism for the transfer of
an action for administrative review when it is wrongly ffled."60 The
state of Iowa has resolved this problem by specifically empowering
any court, in the interest of justice, to transfer a petition for adminis-
trative review to another court.61
V. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF NEBRASKA'S STATUTORY
SCHEME
Because administrative decisions can and do operate to deprive cit-
izens of property (as in a tax assessment) or liberty (as in a mental
health confinement proceeding), the administrative process must sat-
isfy procedural due process standards. Both the United States Consti-
tution and the Nebraska Constitution guarantee citizens the right to
due process of law before the deprivation of life, liberty, or property.
6 2
Most often in administrative law, procedural due process focuses on
the inner workings of the administrative process, but this Note fo-
cuses on the judicial review process. 63 The two basic elements of pro-
cedural due process include notice and the opportunity to be heard.
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.64 provides the oft-
quoted definition of procedural due process: Due process requires "no-
tice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise in-
terested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an
opportunity to present their objections.... The notice must be of such
nature as reasonably to convey the required information .... "65
In an administrative appeal, procedural due process means the pe-
titioner must have notice, which is provided by statute, and an oppor-
tunity to be heard, which is provided by district court review. A
plaintiff will lose her right to be heard, however, if she fails to comply
with statutory requirements necessary to invoke the court's jurisdic-
tion of the appeal. Under this circumstance, the individual's due pro-
60. Id. at 676.
61. "When a proceeding for judicial review has commenced, a court may, in the inter-
ests of justice, transfer the proceeding to another court where venue is proper."
IOWA CODE § 17A.19(2) (1995).
62. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2; NEB. CONST. art. I, § 3.
63. A separate question exists. If the agency has satisfied due process prior to the
judicial review, must the judicial review still meet due process standards? For
the purposes of this Note, the assumed answer is yes. It is ironic that judicial
review of agency decisions was motivated in the 1940's by the concern that agen-
cies themselves might deprive citizens of due process. The current procedure
seems to give the aggrieved citizen a double dose of due process. For a Nebraska
case that arguably holds only one "dose" of due process is required, see Stauffer v.
Weedlun, 188 Neb. 105, 195 N.W.2d 218 (1972).
64. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
65. Id. at 314 (citing Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385 (1914)).
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cess right is not violated. For example, if the statute requires that the
petition be brought within thirty days of a final decision, the plaintiff
who waits 31 days has lost the right to be heard. Notice to the plain-
tiff here is adequate and reasonable. She has thirty days and no more.
This is why the petitioner in Downer arguably was not deprived of due
process, even though he lost the opportunity to be heard. The statute
clearly required Downer to file a copy of the record of the administra-
tive proceedings with the court within thirty days after filing the ac-
tion, and the plaintiff failed to do so. 66
The jurisdictional requirement of section 84-917(2)(a), however,
does not give clear notice to the plaintiff. Section 84-917(2)(a) in-
structs the plaintiff to file "in the district court of the county where the
action was taken" without specifying the requisite action.67 The Ne-
braska Supreme Court's interpretation of the "action taken" tells the
plaintiff to file in the district where "the first adjudicated hearing of a
disputed claim" took place.68 The application of this standard as seen
in Metro, Downer, Flamingo, and Ihms fails to provide clear notice of
where to file the appeal and thus does not afford procedural due
process.
For example, consider the Metro jurisdiction test as applied to an
actual complaint brought by Walter Bray, a prison inmate.69 On Feb-
ruary 22, 1996, which was a few weeks after Metro was decided, Bray
was arrested by the Omaha Police Department for intoxication in vio-
lation of rules governing prisoner release. Bray was on a nine hour
pass from the Omaha Correctional Center to look for work. Pursuant
to the Department of Correctional Services' disciplinary rules, a pre-
liminary hearing was held on February 18, 1996, to determine
whether to bring disciplinary proceedings against Bray. The prelimi-
nary hearing was held at the Omaha Correctional Center. As a result
of the preliminary hearing, Correctional Services conducted an inves-
tigation. On February 28, a disciplinary committee hearing convened
at the Omaha facility. Bray testified at the hearing, and the investi-
gating officer introduced evidence from the Omaha Police Depart-
ment. The committee found Bray guilty of escape, unlawful activity,
and intoxication and sentenced him accordingly. The committee re-
corded its findings and decision in a disciplinary committee action
sheet.
Bray appealed the committee's decision to the Department of Cor-
rections Appeals Board, located in Lincoln, Nebraska. The Appeals
66. Downer v. Ihms, 192 Neb. 594, 601-02, 223 N.W.2d 148, 152 (1974).
67. NEB. REv. STAT. § 84-917(2)(a) (Reissue 1992).
68. Metro Renovation, Inc. v. Department of Labor, 249 Neb. 337, 341, 543 N.W.2d
715, 719 (1996).
69. Bray v. Department of Corrections, No. 541-3 (D. Lancaster County ified July 17,
1996).
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Board reversed the conviction for intoxication because the Omaha Po-
lice Department failed to test Bray's blood alcohol level while he was
in custody. The Board affirmed the other two convictions. Bray then
filed an appeal under section 84-917 in Lancaster County District
Court. Did Bray file in the correct court?
To determine where jurisdiction is proper, one must look first to
see if the Department of Correctional Services is governed by statutes
or regulations that set forth where an appeal for judicial review can be
filed. If so, the requirements under section 84-917(2) are inapplica-
ble.70 In Bray's case, however, the Department defers to the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act to establish the method of review.7 ' Thus, Bray
must determine where the first adjudicated hearing of a disputed
claim took place. For many litigants, this is a straightforward ques-
tion if all agency activity occurred within one district. Such was the
case in Flamingo.72 In Bray's case, as in Metro, the agency's activity
is divided between two districts. Thus, Bray's choice is either Douglas
County District Court, where the preliminary hearing and discipli-
nary committee hearing took place, or Lancaster County District
Court, where the Appeals Board hearing took place.
In Metro, the agency activity involved a hearing and investigation
in Omaha, and a final decision in Lincoln. While there was some un-
derlying ambiguity in Metro regarding whether the hearing was an
actual adjudication and whether the hearing involved a disputed
claim, the situation in Bray's case seems much clearer: Bray's disci-
plinary committee hearing appears to satisfy every element of the
Metro test. It was an adjudicatory hearing. At its conclusion, the com-
mittee decided the charges against the accused. The committee sat as
fact-finder and judge, heard evidence from both sides, and issued a
decision. The hearing involved a disputed claim insofar as the Depart-
ment prosecuted Bray for violating the disciplinary rules of the facil-
ity, and Bray defended himself against the claim. The committee
hearing was the first such adjudicated hearing. If Bray's case is in-
tended to prove that the Metro rule does not give proper notice, it
seems to prove the opposite. The Metro test purports to place jurisdic-
tion in Omaha at the Douglas County District Court.
Bray, however, filed his appeal in Lancaster County District Court,
where the appeal's committee decided Bray's internal appeal. The
Lancaster County District Court believed jurisdiction was instead
proper in Douglas County because the "action taken" was the discipli-
nary hearing conducted in Omaha. The court transferred Bray's case
70. 'The review provided for by this section shall not be available in any case where
other provisions of law prescribe the method of appeal." NEB. REv. STAT. § 84-
917(7) (Reissue 1992).
71. Reed v. Parratt, 207 Neb. 796, 301 N.W.2d 343 (1981).
72. Flamingo, Inc. v. Nebraska Liquor Comm'n, 185 Neb. 22, 173 N.W.2d 369 (1969).
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to Douglas County.73 The Lancaster County District Court's decision
to transfer Bray's appeal was the incorrect procedural action, how-
ever. As discussed above, if the proper place to file was the Douglas
County District Court, then the Lancaster County District Court
lacked jurisdiction over Bray's appeal. Without jurisdiction, the Lan-
caster County District Court had no authority to transfer the appeal.
The proper action would have been to dismiss Bray's appeal.7 4 This
procedural quandry was not questioned in Bray's appeal, however, be-
cause the issue was not raised. Thus, the case was resolved in Doug-
las County. Nevertheless, as section 84-917(2)(a) is written,
administrative appeals are a one-way ticket to the district court where
the action was taken. Period. Thus, if Douglas County District Court
had jurisdiction over Bray's appeal (and Lancaster County District
Court lacked jurisdiction), then the Lancaster County District Court's
action to transfer Bray's case was void. Bray's appeal should have
been dismissed, leaving Bray to fie in Douglas County District Court
within the prescribed time.
Setting aside the issue of transfer, at least a colorable argument
can be made that the Lancaster County District Court had jurisdiction
over Bray's appeal and therefore Bray properly filed his appeal. One
could assert that the first adjudicated decision of a disputed claim
must also qualify as a final decision because section 84-917 refers to
the need for a final decision in subsection one and subsection two.75
One could also assert that the disputed claim Bray raises on appeal is
the decision by the Appeals Board to uphold two of his convictions, not
the disciplinary committee's earlier decision.76
Moreover, the phrase "where the action is taken" is vague enough
that a court reasonably could assign jurisdiction of Bray's appeal to
either Douglas or Lancaster County District Court. Simply relying
upon the court's initiative to transfer a case to the court with jurisdic-
tion fails to resolve the ambiguity in the statute because section 84-
917(2)(a) does not confer this authority to a court lacking jurisdiction.
Dismissal is the only appropriate action under the statute. Thus, sec-
tion 84-917(2)(a) does not "reasonably... convey the required infor-
mation"77 to instruct an individual where to properly file an
administrative appeal, even with the guidance of the Metro test. The
statute provides inadequate notice to afford procedural due process to
those pursuing judicial review of administrative rulings.
73. Bray v. Department of Corrections, No. 541-3 (D. Lancaster County filed July 17,
1996)(transferred July 29, 1997, to Douglas County)
74. Pool v. Director of Revenue, 824 S.W.2d 515, 516-17 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992); County
of Coles v. Property Tax Appeal Bd., 657 N.E.2d 673 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995).
75. NEB. REV. STAT. § 84-917 (1)-(2) (Reissue 1992).
76. See supra note 45 and accompanying text for a discussion of what constitutes a
disputed claim.
77. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950).
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As a policy consideration, applying the Metro rule to Bray's case
may have one of two undesirable results. First, the Department could
conduct all disciplinary committee hearings in Lancaster County,
which would require the additional time and expense of transporting a
prisoner in Omaha to Lincoln for the hearing. Or, the Department
could defend these administrative appeals in both jurisdictions, which
also would require additional time and expense. Second, it could be
argued that the Metro rule will have a restrictive effect on all state
agencies. Agencies will be motivated to conduct activities exclusively
in Lancaster County to avoid the cost of litigating outside the state
capital. This in turn would impose a tremendous cost on the residents
of Nebraska who do not live in the southeast section of the state.
VI. HOW TO RESOLVE THE PROBLEM OF THE ONE-WAY
TICKET
Several possible solutions may solve the problem of the one-way
ticket policy of section 84-917(2)(a). As the statute itself notes, admin-
istrative agencies are free to adopt their own specific procedures for
judicial review.78 For example, the Motor Vehicle Safety Respon-
sbility Act (MVRSA) governs appeals of any order or act of the Depart-
ment of Motor Vehicles. Pursuant to section 60-503 of the Nebraska
Code, jurisdiction of an appeal from a MVRSA decision rests with the
district court where the petitioner resides or, if the petitioner is a non-
resident, in the Lancaster County District Court.79 In fact, the stat-
ute expressly renounces the procedures set forth in the Administrative
Procedure Act.80 A petitioner can understand and comply with the
jurisdictional requirements for administrative appeals brought under
section 60-503 without difficulty. This solution is piecemeal, however.
The Administrative Procedure Act is designed to provide minimum
standards for state agencies,S1 and those minimum standards should
pass constitutional muster.
As noted previously, the statute could be amended to authorize dis-
trict courts to transfer administrative appeals to the court with juris-
diction to hear the case.8 2 This solution could solve the constitutional
problem. The litigant would not necessarily be denied her day in court
because of a jurisdictional requirement that provides inadequate no-
tice. In cases similar to the facts of Keya Paha or Downer, the Ne-
braska Supreme Court could remand the case to the district court
with instructions to transfer the case to the proper district court.
While somewhat more tenable, this would still be a very costly and
78. NEB. REv. STAT. § 84-917(1) (Reissue 1992).
79. Id. § 60-503(1) (1995).
80. Id. § 60-503(2).
81. Id. § 84-915.01 (Reissue 1992).
82. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
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frustrating solution for all involved. Empowering the courts to trans-
fer an administrative appeal would not solve the practical problem,
faced by litigants and judges alike, of determining where the appeal
should be filed in the first place.
The Arkansas legislature dealt with the problem of determining
jurisdiction in the following manner:
Proceedings for review shall be instituted by filing a petition, within thirty
(30) days after service upon petitioner of the agency's final decision, in:
A) The circuit court of the county in which the petitioner resides or does
business; or
B) The Circuit Court of Pulaski County, [where the state capital is
located].
8 3
This statute follows the suggested form of the 1981 Model Administra-
tive Procedure Act, but does not confer subject matter jurisdiction to
all district courts.8 4 This means that although Arkansas agencies
may have to travel outside Pulaski County to litigate appeals, the
plaintiff cannot arbitrarily select a court. Making the jurisdictional
requirements similar to venue requirements also reduces the likeli-
hood that citizens in more remote sections of the state will be subject
to traveling distances disproportionate to those who live in more popu-
lous areas.8 5 Admittedly, it is much more convenient and cost effec-
tive for the state to litigate all administrative appeals in the judicial
district of the state capital. Most, if not all, agencies and agency attor-
neys are headquartered in the state capital. State agencies, however,
are better equipped to deal with travel costs than are individual liti-
gants. Telephonic hearings can be used to reduce costs, particularly to
individual litigants, because state agencies have better resources to
initiate telephonic judicial hearings than do individual litigants.
The best way to resolve the difficulties of the Metro jurisdictional
rule is to revise section 84-917(2)(a) to read as follows: Proceedings for
review shall be filed in the District Court of Lancaster County, or in
the district court of the county where the petitioner resides, or in the
district court of the county where the petitioner has his or her princi-
pal place of business. This rule would allow Bray to file his appeal in
Lancaster County District Court without worrying about whether ju-
risdiction arises out of the Omaha hearing or the Lincoln Appeals
Board decision. Such statutory construction would eliminate the need
to analyze the discrete elements of what the fact-finder did in Omaha
and what the Commissioner did in Lincoln to determine the site of the
first adjudicated hearing in a disputed claim. In other words, it would
be unnecessary to analyze multiple levels of agency procedures to de-
83. Amc. CODE ANN. § 25-15-212(b)(1)(A)-(B) (Michie 1995).
84. MODEL STATE ADMIN. PROCEDURE AcT § 5-104(b), 15 U.L.A_ 113 (1981)(amended
1990).
85. Compelling litigants to travel to a distant, inconvenient forum raises due process
questions as well, but such questions are beyond the scope of this Note.
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termine the proper "action" that confers jurisdiction. For example, the
proposed statute would allow the Keya Paha School District to file its
appeal in the Keya Paha District Court; Metro Renovation could ap-
peal in either Douglas or Lancaster County District Court.
In short, such a change would provide procedural due process to
the litigants and promote judicial economy in the courts. Perhaps the
Nebraska legislature will consider such a revision at its next
opportunity.
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